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Employment Law Digest February 2026 – Case law update

Stay up to date with recent employment case law developments as Katie Adams explores the significant decisions that are shaping the legal landscape of workplace rights and responsibilities.

Volunteers and ‘worker’ status

In Maritime and Coastguard Agency v Groom:

  • Mr Groom was one of approximately 3,100 Coastguard Rescue Officers (“CROs”) in the UK. He was part of the Maritime and Coastguard Agency’s (“the MCA”) Coastguard Rescue Service, made up of around 325 rescue teams, and had been a volunteer for the Service since 1985.
  • As a CRO, Mr Groom was issued with a volunteer handbook containing policies and procedures and a code of conduct. CROs could submit claims for payment for “time, travel and expenses”. Time was paid for at an hourly rate not less than national minimum wage.
  • In May 2020 Mr Groom was asked to attend a disciplinary hearing. His position as a CRO was terminated by the MCA with effect from 5 June 2020.
  • Mr Groom claimed that he was entitled (as a ‘worker’) to be accompanied to a ‘Challenge Meeting’ (an appeal hearing) by a member of his trade union. The MCA did not permit Mr Groom to be accompanied at the meeting.
  • The appeal was unsuccessful and Mr Groom was issued with a P45.
  • The employment tribunal (ET) considered Mr Groom’s contractual status and in particular, whether he met the test for ‘worker’ status, which would give him the right to be accompanied to a disciplinary hearing (as the right to be accompanied to a disciplinary meeting applies both to employees and to workers).
  • In his claim, Mr Groom stated: “…The main purpose of my claim is to establish the rights of a Coastguard Rescue Officer within the Maritime and Coastguard Agency; and to prevent a similar treatment to others in the service in future”.
  • Although Mr Groom’s claim focussed on his right to be accompanied, the issue of his status had wide ramifications since the same definition of ‘worker’ applies for the purposes of qualifying for a variety of other statutory rights such as payment of the national minimum wage, paid holiday, the right to claim unlawful deductions from wages and the protection of whistleblowers.

In the ET, Mr Groom’s claim was dismissed on the basis that he was not a ‘worker’ as he was not at any time contractually obliged to provide work or services to the MCA.

Following an appeal, the Employment Appeal Tribunal (EAT) set aside the ET’s decision and substituted a finding that Mr Groom had been a ‘worker’ at the relevant time. It found that “the only proper construction of the documents is that a contract comes into existence when a [volunteer] attends an activity in respect of which there is a right to remuneration.”

The Court of Appeal (CoA) upheld the decision of the EAT:

  • The documents showed that while a CRO was not obliged to attend for work on any particular occasion, and could specify the time for which they were willing to do so, if they did attend they were bound to obey reasonable instructions; and were entitled, although not compelled, to claim remuneration for much of that work. A contract came into existence each time a CRO attended for an activity in respect of which there was a right to claim payment.
  • There was mutuality of obligation between the Agency and a CRO who has attended for work. The basic obligations (on the part of the CRO) were to comply with reasonable instructions while on duty (and, on the part of the MCA) to make payment on receipt of a claim for attendance for relevant activities. This was a wage/work bargain.
  • The fact that there was no umbrella contract to cover the gaps when the CRO was not working did not matter to there being a finding of ‘worker’ status during the periods of work.
  • Although the documents described the relationship between the MCA and the CROs as an entirely voluntary one, this written insistence that the relationship was voluntary did not accurately reflect the reality of the wage/work bargain that had been struck.

As was stated in the CoA judgment, volunteers come in many shapes and sizes, and it cannot be assumed that all will have the same status in law. Care needs to be taken to analyse the status of volunteers.

Gross misconduct and documenting important procedures

In Kisheva v Secure Frontline Services:

  • Ms Kisheva, a door supervisor, left work part-way through a shift after an argument with a colleague.
  • The employer did not investigate the incident or follow any proper procedure and dismissed Ms Kisheva for gross misconduct.
  • Ms Kisheva claimed unfair dismissal.
  • The employment tribunal (ET) accepted that the reason for Ms Kisheva leaving part-way through her shift was because she was upset following an argument with a colleague. She notified her team leader that she was leaving. However, the misconduct for which she was disciplined was that she had left without informing the employer by telephone via its central telephone number.
  • The ET reached a finding that Ms Kisheva had been unfairly dismissed but concluded that a 100% reduction should be applied to both the basic and compensatory awards on the basis that her failure to telephone the employer immediately to explain that she was leaving the venue amounted to gross misconduct.

Ms Kisheva appealed to the Employment Appeal Tribunal (EAT). The EAT found that:

  • It was perverse for the ET to have concluded that the employer was entitled to treat the combination of leaving early and not making a phone call as gross misconduct. The requirement to make a phone call was nowhere be found in the employer’s code of conduct, neither was it the basis for the dismissal as set out in the ET3. At worst, the failure to make a call was an administrative requirement delivered orally in training, which was not documented in a code of conduct which set out many matters justifying instant dismissal and multiple instances of gross misconduct.
  • On the evidence set out by the ET there was only one conclusion which it could legitimately have reached – that Ms Kisheva was not guilty of gross misconduct.
  • Having held that the finding that Ms Kisheva was guilty of gross misconduct was perverse and not open to the ET on the evidence, the EAT sent the matter to a differently constituted ET to deal with all matters of remedy on the basis that the finding of unfair dismissal stood, but that the ET was not entitled to consider the claimant’s conduct as gross misconduct.

This case is a reminder of the importance of having clear policies and procedures in place that are communicated to staff. Employees need to know what is expected of them. Further, it is a reminder of the importance of carrying out a reasonable investigation and proper procedure prior to making any decision to dismiss.